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NOTES
Antitrust: Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp.:
Evaluating Unilateral Behavior in the Tenth Circuit*
i. Introduction
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition
as the rule of trade. It rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our
economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of our democratic, political
and social institutions.'
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "combinations, contracts, or conspiracies
in restraint of trade"' in order to simultaneously limit unfair exploitation of market
power and protect aggressive trade practices. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, in City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.,4 held that
a plaintiff and a single seller, as co-conspirators in a vertical tying arrangement,
do not form the requisite combination in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act.' This position is inconsistent with prior Tenth Circuit holdings and United
States Supreme Court precedent. In Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang LaboratoriesCorp.
(Systemcare 1),' the Tenth Circuit incorrectly affirmed Chanute.7 In the process,
the court not only disregarded existing precedent but also effectively expanded
Chanute, concluding vertical conspiracies involving a third party and single seller
as co-conspirators do not form the combination required by section 1. Fortunately,
in June 1997, an en banc hearing of the Tenth Circuit (Systemcare I1)' vacated its
* This paper was selected by the American Bar Association's Section of Business Law as the
Outstanding Paper in the Mendes-Hershman Student Writing Contest.
1. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
3. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3 ANTrrRusT LAW, POUCY, AND

PROCEDURE 1-2 (3rd ed. 1994); see also Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
766 (1984).
4. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992), overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
5. See id. at 650.
6. 85 F.3d 465 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).

7. See id. at 470.
8. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997).
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previous holding, reversed and remanded the lower court decision, and overturned
Chanute.

Actions for antitrust violations are brought under three major antitrust laws: the
Sherman Act,9 the Clayton Act,"0 and the Federal Trade Commission Act." Such
actions may be brought by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), Department of

Justice, or by private citizens." When bringing private action for an antitrust
violation, a plaintiffs source of enforcement is limited. 3 For plaintiffs involved
in service industries that are not bringing action against a monopoly defendant,
section 1 of the Sherm.an Act is the most frequently used source of private antitrust

protection.
This note examines the effect of the current position of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as it relates to national antitrust policy established
by other circuits and the United States Supreme Court. Part II of this note presents

the relevant case law defining independent behavior according to section 1 of the
Sherman Act, particularly in the case of .tying arrangements. Part LI analyzes

Systemcare I, wherein the Tenth Circuit affirmed its previous decision, solidifying
a controversial standard for evaluating independent vertical behavior in tying
arrangements. 4 Part IV evaluates the rationale behind the Systemcare I decision
and suggests contradictory reasoning. Part V examines alternative justifications for

the Systemcare I decision. Part VI considers the Tenth Circuit's recent change of
course in Systemcare II, which recognizes vertical conspiracies between a buyer
and seller in tying arrangements. Finally, part VII discusses potential implications

of the Tenth Circuit position.
IL Bringing an Antitrust Action Under Sherman
Act Section 1: Tying Arrangements
Section 1 of the Sherman Act is a primary enforcement mechanism for private

antitrust actions." The section is designed to allow extensive judicial involvement
in law making. 6 To bring an action under section 1 of the Sherman Act, a

9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1994).
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1994); see also D. Kent Meyers & Ira Horowitz, Private Enforcement of
the Antitrust Laws Works Occasionally: Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma v. NCAA, A
Case in Point, 48 OKLA. L. REv. 669, 672 (1995) (discussing enforcement under federal antitrust
provisions).
11. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1994); see also Meyers & Horowitz, supranote 10, at 672 (1995) (discussing Federal Trade Commission and enforcement of antitrust laws).
12. See SULLIvAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, at 75.
13. The FTC act is a public enforcement statute and does not offer a private remedy. See 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-77 (1994). The Cklyton Act is specifically limited to trade of commodities. See 15 U.S.C. 13
(1994). Section 2 of the Sherman Act will be a factor only if the plaintiff alleges monopolization or an
attempt to monopolize by the defendant. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see also Meyers & Horowitz, supra
note 10, at 671-75 (discussing enforcement under federal antitrust provisions).
14. See Systemcare , 85 F.3d at 470.
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
16. See Robert H. Bcrk, Legislative Intent and Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7, 7-8
(1966) (discussing consumer welfare and the judicial role).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss2/8

1997]

NOTES

plaintiff must establish: (1) a "combination, contract, or conspiracy", 7 (2) "in
restraint of trade"." However, before a plaintiffs allegations of unreasonable
restraint of trade can be examined, the court must first find that a combination,
contract, or conspiracy exists.' 9
Two main structural categories of trade restraints exist: horizontal restraints of
trade and vertical restraints of trade. A horizontal violation involves an agreement
between two competitors to restrain trade.' A vertical violation involves an
agreement between two dealers on separate levels of a distribution chain.2' A
conspiracy between a manufacturer and a retailer is an example of a vertical
agreement, while a conspiracy between two manufacturers is horizontal in nature.
A. Independent Versus ConcertedAction
The purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act is to prevent combinations or
conspiracies that restrict other individuals' freedom to trade or conduct business.'
Congress recognized the difficulty in distinguishing between healthfully robust
competition and conduct that is anticompetitive in natureY For example, conduct
that is harmful to competition is frequently more resource-efficient or cost-effective
to consumers or other segments within that market.' Consequently, section 1 only
prohibits combinations unreasonably restraining trade?'
Thus, section 1 does not restrict individual acts.' Restricting individual competitive business efforts could potentially deter aggressive competition and
entrepreneurial goals upon which business innovation is based.' Concerted action,
on the other hand, is discouraged because of its anticompetitive effects.' Combinations or other concerted actions typically reduce independent decision making
that is essential to the competitive process." Any potential resource efficiencies
or savings to consumers created by concerted behavior are outweighed by overall
anticompetitive effects."

17. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).

18. la,
19. See McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 1988), overruledon other grounds
by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997); Motor Parts Warehouse
v. Facet Enter., 774 F.2d 380, 386 (10th Cir. 1985); Contractor Util. Sales Co. v. Certain-teed Prod.

Corp., 638 F.2d 1061, 1074 (7th Cir. 1981).
20. See SULLvAN & HOvENKAMP, supra note 3, at 183.

21. See Business Elec. Corp. v. Sharp Elec. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724-25 (1988); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANTrrIUST L.J. 135, 140 (1984).
22. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 366 (1919).
23. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 766 (1984).
24. See id. at 768.

25.
26.
27.
28.

See id, at 767-69.
See id. at 767-68.
See id. at 767.
See id. at 768.

29. See id.

30. See id.
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Consequently, proof of a combination or conspiracy is a prerequisite to finding
a section 1 violation, regardless of a defendant's trade restraining actions." For
example, a seller may independently announce, in advance, the conditions upon
which he will sell, or refuse to sell, a product. 2 The seller, acting independently,
may set conditions that, when set by a monopoly or group of sellers, would
otherwise be illegal restraints of trade.33
Despite courts' favor for independent competition, some limitations have been
placed upon unilateral actions. For example, under United States v. Parke, Davis
& Co.," once a seller steps beyond mere announcement of conditions for sale and
attempts to enforce those conditions through coercion, the seller's acts fall within
section 1. A typical coercive enforcement mechanism by a seller is a threat of
terminated future dealing if the buyer does not comply with anticompetitive trade
practices. At that point, the vertical agreement between the buyer and seller is
considered an illegal combination in restraint of trade. 5
In addition to courts' recognition of the danger of unilateral conduct when
coupled with coercion, barriers to prosecution of unilateral action are also
recognized. One example of the United States Supreme Court's support for
unilateral activity is through its rejection of "intra-enterprise" liability in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.' A corporation and its whollyowned subsidiary are not considered separate entities for the purpose of finding
concerted action between multiple parties under the Sherman Act. 7 Further, in
Monsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Service Corp., the United States Supreme Court
significantly increased a plaintiffs evidentiary burden.39 Only evidence that
excludes the possibility of independent action between manufacturers and
nonterminated distributors will be allowed. Mere showing of complaints by a

31. See Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1986); McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854
F.2d 365,367-68 (10th Cir. 1988), overruledon other groundsby Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories
Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
32. See United Statos v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
33. See id. The Colgate Court stated:
In absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the act does not restrict the
long recognized tight of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business,
freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal;
and, of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell.
I.
34. 362 U.S. 29,44 (1960); see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1968) (citing United
States v. Arnold, Schwin & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967)).

35. See Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. at 44.
36. 467 U.S. 752, 776-77 (1984).
37. See id. at 753. The Copperweld Court provided: "In any conspiracy, two or more entities that
previously pursued their own interests separately are combining to act as one for their own common
benefit." Id. at 769. To the contrary, a corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary consistently maintain
common interests, thus a combination or conspiracy cannot result from their action. See id. at 753.
38. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
39. See id. at 764.
40. See id.
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distributor to a manufacturer followed by subsequent termination of the business
relationship will not sufficiently prove the existence of a vertical conspiracy
between a manufacturer and other distributors." Thus, the Court established a
high standard for a plaintiff attempting to prove a coerced vertical conspiracy.
B. Tying Arrangements
Protection of individual behavior creates unique difficulties to bringing a section
1 action against a seller for an improper tying arrangement. A tying arrangement
is an agreement by one party to sell a desirable product (the "tying product"), but
only on the condition that the buyer purchases a second, less desirable product (the
"tied product").!2 Not all conditional sales, however, constitute anticompetitive
tying arrangements. If no separate market for the second product exists, then the
sale conditions merely amount to competitive product packaging.
A tying arrangement becomes an unreasonable restraint of trade when a seller
extends its market power in the first product to force the buyer to purchase the
second, less desirable product." This extension of market power is essential to
proving an illegal tying arrangement." Even if the buyer wants only the first
product, he still must purchase the second product. Thus, buyers' choices in the
second product's market are effectively limited.4 The benefits of the natural
competition in the second product market are mitigated and other competitors'
efforts to provide alternative choices within that market are undercut
Even if a tying arrangement is considered anticompetitive, barriers still exist to
section 1 enforcement. For example, a seller may unilaterally tie one product to
another without entering into a conspiracy with another party. 4 If a seller never
needs to act in concert with another party, then section 1 is of little significance"

41. See id.
42. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2,
9-10 (1984).
43. For example, the sale of a right shoe is typically conditioned upon the sale of a left shoe.
Production efficiencies and consumer demand, however, prevent a viable individual market for either
shoe, by itself. The conditioned sale is not considered a tying arrangement. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
FEDERAL ANTrTusT POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACrICE 353 (1994).
44. See Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 9-10.
45. See id. at 13-14; see also Fortner Enter., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503-04
(1969) (discussing "sufficient economic power"). If both products exist within perfectly competitive
markets, then buyers may freely decide to individually purchase either product from another seller,
without concern for the conditions of the tying arrangement set by the first seller. See HOVENKAMP,
supra note 43, at 354.
46. See Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 13-14.
47. See id.
48. See McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 368 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled on other parts
by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997); see also Sargent Welch
Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 709 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing unilateral tying under
section 2 of the Sherman Act).
49. See supra notes 22-33 and accompanying text.
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Proving that a combination or conspiracy exists is a difficult barrier to overcome
when alleging a tying arrangement.
Typically, the existence of a single seller and single buyer will be indicative of
unilateral behavior on the part of the seller. However, a plaintiff alleging a tying
arrangement by a single seller may establish a vertical conspiracy under section 1
by proving one of two exceptions.5 The United States Supreme Court, in Perma
Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalPartsCorp.,S created these exceptions through
the logical extension of principles previously established in Parke, Davis.53
First, a plaintiff may show that he unwillingly complied with an anticompetitive
trade practice, such 's a tying arrangement, in response to a refusal to deal 4 by

the defendant55 In pari delicto, the equal fault of the plaintiff, will not prevent
a plaintiff from bringing action against a defendant.' Second, the plaintiff can
show that, while he did not comply with a tying arrangement, another third-party
buyer was coerced into a tying arrangement by a defendant's refusal to deal?
Forced acquiescence of a third-party will not prevent the establishment of an
illegal conspiracy."

Thus, Perma Life recognized two types of vertical

conspiracies to be alleged by a plaintiff: (1) agreements involving a single seller
and the coerced plaintiff, as a buyer; and (2) agreements between a single seller

and a coerced third-party buyer. These two classifications are consistent with prior
holdings relating to unilateral action and were not overruled by Copperweld or
Monsanto."

50. See United States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
51. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); see also
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968).
52. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
53. See id. at 142; see also Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 150 n.6 (discussing United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 372 (1967)); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 44
(1960)); supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
56. Courts acknowledge a public policy encouraging competition over the particular wrongdoing of
a plaintiff. The threat of suit by the plaintiff deters anticompetitive behavior and furthers antitrust policy
objectives. See PermaLife, 392 U.S. at 138; see also Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 16 (1964)
(coerced participant in unlawful conspiracy can bring suit); Keifer-Stewart v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211,214 (1951) (plaintiff cannot be barred from recovery by proof of involvement in unrelated
conspiracy).
57. See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 138.
58. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 161 (1948); MCM Partners, Inc.
v. Andrews-Bartlett & Assoc., 62 F.3d 967, 973 (1995).
59. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 765-66 (expressly holding
that PermaLife was not overturned); Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 903 F.2d 612, 619
(9th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 503 U.S. 1215 (1991) (holding that Monsanto did not exclude coerced
tying arrangements); Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp., 776 F.2d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 1985)
(holding that Perma Life was not overturned by either Supreme Court decision); Black Gold, Ltd. v.
Rockwool Indus., 732 F.2d 779, 780 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding Perma Life was not overturned by
Monsanto).
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C. Tenth CircuitPosition Priorto Systemcare I
I Consistent interpretation of antitrust policy is not as prevalent within the Tenth
Circuit. In 1992, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in City
of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co.' held that a plaintiff could not prove an
illegal tying arrangement under section 1 of the Sherman Act without showing a
conspiracy between the seller and a party other than the plaintiff."' In Chanute,
eight cities in Kansas and Oklahoma (the Cities) alleged Williams Natural Gas
Company (Williams) unlawfully tied its own natural gas products to the use of its
natural gas pipeline.' The Cities claimed that Williams forced them to buy its
natural gas when the Cities would have preferred a third-party's gas they had
purchased previously.'
The majority found that the only other parties to the tying arrangement were the
plaintiffs themselves.' Relying heavily upon McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital,' the
majority entered summary judgment in favor of Williams because the plaintiffs did
not show the requisite conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act.' The court
held that a plaintiff can only establish a conspiracy between the seller and another
party.' Barring that, the conspiracy did not meet section 1 requirements. Subsequently, the majority discarded the issue of force or coercion of the tying arrangement as "moot. '
The Chanute majority rendered its decision despite alternate decisions from the
Tenth Circuit in Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Industries (Black Gold I and Black
Gold 11)' and Smith Machinery v. Hesston Corp.7" However, Judge Seymour's
concurrence in Chanute discussed the inconsistency between the Chanute majority
and the previous Tenth Circuit opinions along with Perma Life, the Supreme Court
opinion upon which the Tenth Circuit based these decisions.' Combined, these
decisions establish that a vertical conspiracy can exist between a seller and the
plaintiff.' Judge Seymour opined that a plaintiff can establish a section 1

60. 955 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1992), overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
61. See id.at650-51.
62. See id.at 650.
63. See id.at 645-46.
64." See id.at650-51.
65. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir 1997). The McKenzie court stated: "[We are not concerned with the legal
possibility of a single entity imposing a tying arrangement on its customers. The question before the
court - and to which we have replied in the negative - is whether such an arrangement is proscribed
by Section One of the Sherman Act." Id. at 368.
66. See Chanute, 955 F.2d at 651.
67. See id.at 650.
68. See id.at 651 n.ll.
69. 729 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1984) and 732 F.2d 779 (10th Cir. 1984).
70. 878 F.2d 1290 (10th Cir. 1989).
71. See Chanute, 955 F.2d at 658-59 (Seymour, J., concurring). See generally supra notes 51-59
and accompanying text.
72. See id.
at 659 (Seymour, J.,
concurring); see also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts
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conspiracy between himself and a single defendant, provided coercion is involved

in forming that conspiracy. 3 In Chanute, the Cities failed to establish a
conspiracy because they did not prove coercion, not because a plaintiff cannot be
a co-conspirator under section L' In other words, the issue of force or coercion
was not only relevant but also essential in evaluating a conspiracy according to
PermaLife. Additionally, Judge Seymour also distinguished McKenzie, finding the
decision inapplicable to the factual situation of Chanute."
Il. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang LaboratoriesCorp.: Statement of the Case

Wang Laboratories Corporation (Wang) manufactures "VS" minicomputers along
with copyrighted software designed by Wang for use with the minicomputer.76
Additionally, Wang provides hardware and software support services.' Wang's

software copyright illows it to be the exclusive provider of software support
systems.78
Systemcare, Inc. (Systemcare) is an Independent Service Operator (ISO) of

computer hardware manufactured by other companies, including Wang computer
hardware.' Systemcare and Wang are competitors in the "VS" computer hardware

support services market.O Systemcare alleged that Wang offered "VS" minicomputer support services in contract packages known as Wang Software Services

(WSS). Under WSS contracts, software support services were only obtainable with
the purchase of hardware support services.8 According to Systemcare, the WSS

contract constituted a tying arrangement whereby Wang used legitimate market
power in the software support services market to illegally eliminate competition

in the hardware support services market."

Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) (stating that a plaintiff "can clearly charge a combination between
[defendant] and himself"); Smith Mach., 878 F.2d at 1294-95 (implying that a conspiracy between a
plaintiff and a seller can be. found if the plaintiff accedes to coercion); Black Gold, Ltd., 729 F.2d at 686
(implying agreement with Perma Life and the possibility of conspiracy between plaintiff and seller).
73. See Chanute, 955 F.2d at 659 (Seymour, J., concurring).
74. See id. (Seymour, J., concurring).
75. See id. (Seymour, J., concurring). In McKenzie, the plaintiff was not able to agree to the alleged
tying arrangement nor did he allege that a third-party had agreed to an arrangement. See id.
76. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 85 F.3d 465, 467 (10th Cir. 1996).
77. Support services for hardware included maintenance and repair. Software support services
provided maintenance services, software updates, technical assistance, remote link assistance and rights
to copy of software. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id
80. See id.
81. See id Wang claimed the software services were available outside the package on an instancespecific basis. Systemcare alleged that the price and quality of the instance-specific services precluded
their purchase over the WSS package. Thus, the price and quality effectively foreclosed the availability
of the market to ISO's. The Court did not reach a decision as to the accuracy of these claims due to the
summary judgment of the "concerted-action" issue. See id
82. See id.
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In 1989, Systemcare filed a complaint against Wang for illegal restraint of trade
in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.' Systemcare alleged a conspiracy
existed between Wang and its purchasers." The district court, relying on the
decision from Chanute,' granted summary judgment for Wang based upon
Systemcare's inability to show the requisite concerted action from section 1 of the
Sherman Act.'
On appeal, Systemcare argued against the application of Chanute.' Systemcare
alleged that the Tenth Circuit's position toward concerted action in tying arrangements was improper.' Systemcare proposed three methods to avoid the
precedent set by Chanute: (1) overturn the decision of the Chanute Tenth Circuit
panel; (2) use dicta from Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc."
to effectively overturn Chanute; and, (3) distinguish Chanute to render it
inapplicable to Systemcare I.'
The court rejected all three of Systemcare's contentions. Rather, the court upheld
Chanute, holding that "a plaintiff must establish a conspiracy between two or more
entities to force such [a tying] agreement upon a third party."'" First, the court
refused to overturn the previous panel precedent from Chanute without either en
banc consideration or a superseding contrary United States Supreme Court
holding.'a Second, the court found Kodak not only factually distinct from
Chanute, but also "several steps away from overruling... Chanute.'93 Third, the
M
court did not recognize Systemcare's proposed factual distinctions of Chanute.'
The majority found "no intellectually honest way to distinguish Chanute from
[Systemcare ]" and considered Chanute applicable precedent.9

83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. The District Court deferred ruling on the summary judgment motion until parties
submitted briefs regarding Chanute. See id.

86. See id. at 470. The court stated:
Thus, according to Chanute, a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity is not
proscribed by section 1of the Sherman Act, even if that arrangement is embodied in a
contract between seller and buyer. Instead, a plaintiff must establish a conspiracy between
two or more entities to force such an agreement upon a third party.

Id.
87. See id. at 469-70.
88. See id.
89. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
90. See Systemcare 1,85 F.3d at 470.
91. Id.
92. See id. at 469-70.

93. Id.at 470.
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. See id.
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IV.Critique of Systemcare Reasoning

The Systemcare I court missed an opportunity to mitigate the Chanute opinion's
treatment of vertical conspiracies in tying arrangements. First, the Systemcare I
court incorrectly accepted Chanute as valid Tenth Circuit precedent and Tenth
Circuit decisions prior to Chanute did not receive adequate consideration. Second,
the Systemcare I court underestimated the influence of Kodak and other United
States Supreme Court decisions. Third, Chanute is factually distinct from Systemcare L The Systemcare I court's broad interpretation effectively expands Chanute
to bar virtually all "buyer-seller" vertical conspiracies from section 1 consideration.
A. Chanute as Jnva~id Tenth Circuit Precedent

En banc consideration procedures are designed to reinforce respect for panel
decisions while maintaining uniformity and continuity within circuit decisions.'
In the Tenth Circuit, granting of en banc procedures occurs only in extraordinary
situations involving: (1) an issue of exceptional public importance or (2) a panel
decision that allegedly conflicts with precedent established by the Supreme Court
or of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 8 The Systemcare I court, a
three-judge panel, held that it could not issue a ruling inconsistent with the
Chanute panel absent en banc consideration or a conflicting Supreme Court
ruling."
However, Chanute, also decided by a three-judge panel, conflicts with previous
decisions from both the United States Supreme Court' and two other Tenth
Circuit panels. 1 Specifically, the Chanute court found that the requisite
conspiracy under section 1 does not exist when an agreement involves only a
single seller and a plaintiff." In other words, a plaintiff and defendant cannot
be co-conspirators. In Perma Life, on the other hand, the United States Supreme
Court expressly validated a plaintiff as a legitimate co-conspirator under section
1 " The Court held that a plaintiff, when faced with a refusal to deal, may
establish the requisite combination or conspiracy under section 1 by showing that
she, herself, unwillingly complied with the agreement. 4

97. See United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960).

98. See 10th Cir. R. 35.1; Fed. R. App. P. 35(a).
99. See Systemcare 1, 85 F.3d at 470.
100. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. InternationalParts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968) (stating
that a plaintiff "can clealy charge a combination between [defendant] and himself').
101. See Black Gold, Ltd. v. Rockwool Indus., Inc., 729 F.2d 676, 686 (10th Cir. 1984) (implying
agreement with Perma Life and the possibility of conspiracy between a plaintiff and a seller); Smith
Mach. v. Hesston Corp., 378 F.2d 1290, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1989) (implying that a conspiracy between
plaintiff and seller can be.found if the plaintiff accedes to coercion).
102. See City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 650-51 (10th Cir. 1992),
overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
103. See Perma Life, 392 U.S. at 142.
104. See id.; see also Chanute 955 F.2d at 659 (Seymour, J., concurring) (citing Perma Life, 392
U.S. at 142).
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Previous three-judge panels of the Tenth Circuit have also verified the formation
of a conspiracy between a single seller and a buyer coerced by "threat of termination.""0 In Black Gold I and Smith Machinery, the Tenth Circuit provided
implied acceptance of the first type of vertical conspiracy" from Perma Life."
Likewise, in Black Gold I and Smith Machinery, the Tenth Circuit discussed the
second type of vertical conspiracy,"0 also recognizing Perma Life as authority." In a supplementary opinion, the Black Gold II court held that Perma Life
survived the heavy section 1 evidentiary burden from Monsanto."' Chanute,
however, is in conflict with these decisions.
Thus, the question arises: how did Chanute become precedent over Black Gold
I and II or Smith Machinery? The Chanute majority does not even mention those
opinions, let alone distinguish or invalidate them. The Systemcare court neither
reinforces the Chanute majority by providing additional precedent as support nor
asserts that Perma Life had been overturned. Further, the court did not reconcile
opposing arguments from Judge Seymour's concurring opinion in Chanute or the
district court in Systemcare I...

Just as the Systemcare I court could not overturn a previous panel, the Chanute
majority should not establish precedent over previous Tenth Circuit decisions."'
The Systemcare I court did not recognize an important inconsistency between
Chanute and both the United States Supreme Court and previous'Tenth Circuit
panels. Following the logic established by the Systemcare I court, Chanute is
invalid precedent in the face of previous Tenth Circuit panels in Black Gold I and
II and Smith Machinery. Thus, the Systemcare I court erred in relying upon
Chanute as valid, controlling Tenth Circuit precedent.
B. Supreme Court & Superseding Law from Kodak

The Tenth Circuit also disagreed with Systemcare's second contention that the
United States Supreme Court effectively overturned Chanute in Eastman Kodak

105. See Smith Mach., 878 F.2d at 1294; Black Gold!, 729 F.2d at 686-87;
106. The first type of vertical conspiracy is conspiracy between a defendant seller and a coerced
plaintiff buyer.
107. See Smith Mach., 878 F.2d at 1294 (implying that a conspiracy between a plaintiff and a seller
can be found if the plaintiff accedes to coercion); Black Gold 1, 729 F.2d at 686 (implying agreement
with Perma Life and the possibility of conspiracy between a plaintiff and a seller).
108. The second type of vertical conspiracy is conspiracy between a defendant seller and a coerced
third-party buyer.
109. See Smith Mach., 878 F.2d at 1294 (accepting the second type of conspiracy under Perma
Life); Black Gold 1, 729 F.2d at 686-87 ("If Rockwool used the refusal to deal with Black Gold to induce
adherence by other customers to a tying arrangement that violates the antitrust laws, Rockwool would
be liable under section 1 of the Sherman Act for unlawfully combining to restrain trade.").
110. See Black Gold II, 732 F.2d at 780. See generallyMonsanto Co. v. Spray Rite Serv., 465 U.S.
752 (1984) (establishing heightened evidentiary standard for proof of existence of conspiracy); supra
notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
S111.See Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs., Inc., 787 F. Supp. 179 (D. Colo. 1992), rev'd, 117 F.3d
1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
112. See Phillip M. Hannan, The PrecedentialForce of Panel Law, 76 MARQ. L. REv. 755, 758
(1993).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:223

Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.."' In Kodak, in an effort to reduce
Independent Service Operators (ISOs) in the market, Kodak instituted a policy to
only sell replacement parts for micrographic and copying machines to buyers of
Kodak equipment who used Kodak service or repaired their own machines. To
support this policy, Kodak entered into agreements with parts manufacturers,
distributors, and owners to not sell parts to ISOs. Before the Court, Kodak
maintained that its dealings with parts purchasers constituted unilateral behavior
by Kodak and not a conspiracy or combination. The Supreme Court, in footnote
8 of the opinion, disagreed: "Assuming, arguendo, that Kodak's refusal to sell parts
to any company providing service can be characterized as a unilateral refusal to
deal, its alleged sale of parts to third parties on condition that they buy service
from Kodak is not [unilateral behavior]."'
The Systemcare I court discounted Kodak's precedentialvalue on two levels.
First, the Tenth Circuit claimed Kodak was factually distinct from Systemcare
L " ' The court stated: "[The plaintiff] in Kodak alleged that Kodak reached
agreements with other independent companies that manufacturedKodak parts to
bar sale of replacement parts to Plaintiff. Such a conspiracy
among multiple
6
parties is precisely what Systemcare has failed to allege.""1
Comparing the tying arrangements involved in both cases, however, Kodak is
not sufficiently distinct from Systemcare L The Systemcare I court misconstrued
which third parties (parts manufacturers as opposed to equipment owners) were
participants in tying arrangements in Kodak. The Systemcare I court assumed the
alleged conspiracy was horizontal, between Kodak and licensed manufacturers..
who refused to sell to anyone, including the plaintiffs, but Kodak. The manufacturers' refusal to sell parts to ISOs, however, was not weighed by the Kodak Court
as part of the tying arrangement. The manufacturers were not alleged as horizontal
co-conspirators with Kodak to coerce a tying arrangement with Image Technical.
Rather, the conspiracy alleged in Kodak was vertical, between Kodak and
equipment owners. In other words, Kodak tied the purchase of Kodak service with
the sale of replacement parts to equipment owners. The Kodak court provided that
"Kodak implemented a policy of selling replacement parts ... only to buyers of
Kodak equipment who use Kodak service or repair their own machines.""' The
Supreme Court confirmed that Kodak and an equipment owner, as a buyer coerced
into purchasing service tied with Kodak replacement parts, were co-conspirators
in the tying arrangement. Clearly, the distinction made by the Systemcare I court
is not valid when considered in the context of the tying arrangement from Kodak.

113. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
114. Id. at 463 n.8 (citing Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 619
(9th Cir. 1990)).
115. See Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 85 F.3d 465, 470 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).

116. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
117. The licensed manufacturers are referred to by the Kodak court as "original-equipment
manufacturers" or "OEM's". See Kodak, 504 U.S. at 457.

118. Id.
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The Systemcare I court looked to the wrong parties in evaluating the tying
arrangement conspiracy in Kodak.
The second major argument by the Systemcare I court directly refutes the
precedential validity of the United States Supreme Court's dicta from footnote 8
of Kodak."9 "While this dicta does provide oblique support for Systemcare's
position, it is several steps away from overruling the rule established in Chanute."" Unfortunately, while the Systemcare I court obviously did not feel the
statement was definite enough to be superseding authority, the court hesitated to
make any other reference to the analysis of the Kodak Court. The court gave no
further indication of its reason for dismissing the Kodak rationale.
The Systemcare I court could have looked to Image Technical Services, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co.,' the Ninth Circuit opinion cited by the Supreme Court in
footnote 8 of Kodak. The Ninth Circuit noted that
Kodak entered into agreements with equipment owners ... that it will
sell parts only to users "who service their own Kodak equipment." If
such conduct were to be labelled "independent", virtually all tying
arrangements would be beyond the reach of Section 1. We do not
believe that Monsanto, without discussing the courts' tying decisions,
meant to overturn them.'2
Ironically, this Monsanto interpretation is the same as that described by Judge
Seymour within her concurring opinion in Chanute." Thus, the Supreme Court,
in a logical extension of Image Technical, was endorsing Judge Seymour's
criticism of the Chanute majority.
Additionally, the Systemcare I court could have looked to other courts for m9re
concrete interpretations of the Kodak dicta. In Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard
Co.,I the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit dealt directly with
the precise unilateral conduct decision at issue with the Systemcare I court; "[Kodak
footnote 81 simply means that, for the purposes of tie-in analysis, the defendant may

119. Regarding unilateral action by a single seller, the Kodak Court stated:
The record indicates that Kodak would sell parts to third parties only if they agreed not
to buy service from ISO's .... Kodak contends that this practice is only a unilateral
refusal to deal which does not violate the antitrust laws. Assuming, arguendo, that
Kodak's refusal to sell parts to any company providing service can be characterized as a
unilateral refusal to deal, [Kodak's] alleged sale of parts to third parties on condition that
they buy service from Kodak is not.
Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463 & n.8 (citing Image Technical, 903 F.2d at 619) (citations omitted).
120. See Systemcare 1, 85 F.3d at 470.
121. 903 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1990).
122. Id. at 619.
123. Compare Image Technical, 903 F.2d at 619 (discussing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761) with
Chanute, 955 F.2d at 659 (same). See generally Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Serv., 465 U.S. 752 (1984)
(establishing heightened evidentiary standard for proof of existence of conspiracy). Further, Image
Technical was cited as supporting Black Gold 1 by Judge Seymour in her Chanute concurring opinion.
Chanute, 955 F.2d at 659 (Seymour, J., concurring) (citing Image Technical, 903 F.2d at 619).
124. 60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995).
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sell the tying product to anybody or nobody at all. What it may not do is condition
the sale of the tying product upon the purchase of the tied product ....
"s The
Datagatecourt found that the Supreme Court intended to prevent the resulting forced
sale from a coerced tying arrangement." A coerced tying arrangement prevents the
buyer from acting independently, resulting in concerted action between the single
buyer plaintiff and single seller defendant." To arbitrarily dismiss the analysis of
several courts, including the Supreme Court and previous Tenth Circuit opinions, as
"oblique" without firther justification or reference is clearly insufficient.
The Systemcare I court also dismissed the Supreme Court dicta as being "several
steps away from overruling the rule established in Chanute."" The Tenth
Circuit, by disregarding the history of previous Supreme Court rulings referenced
by the Ninth Circuit in Image Technical, avoids the issue. 9 The plaintiffs do not
need to rely upon Kodak dicta as authority because the Supreme Court previously
dealt with vertical conspiracies in Perma Life and Parke,Davis.3
The dicta from Kodak validates the Ninth Circuit's reliance upon those previous
Supreme Court decisions when it cites to the Ninth Circuit opinion. Further,
Perma Life dealt directly with the coerced vertical conspiracies at issue in Systemcare L Its authority is neither mere dicta nor "several steps away" from
overturning Chanute. Neither court in Systemcare I or Chanute directly contends
that Perma Life is no longer valid law. Both Perma Life and Parke, Davis
recognized the importance of coercion in establishing a vertical conspiracy. By
dismissing the issue of force as "mioot," Chanute is in direct conflict with these
decisions. The court clearly erred in dismissing the Supreme Court's dicta from
Kodak without further evaluation.
C. FactualDistinctions between Systemcare I & Chanute
Systemcare attempted to factually distinguish Chanute as the third method of
avoiding the Tenth Circuit decision from that case."' As before, the Systemcare
I court disagreed. While several proposed factual distinctions were correctly
discouraged,'33 the court overlooked the factual distinctions of Chanute and
Systemcare I within the context of the two types of vertical conspiracies described

125. lId at 1426 (analyzing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 463 n.8).
126. See it.
127. See id. (discussing Monsanto).
128. Systemcare, In.. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 85 F.3d 465, 470 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 F.3d
1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
129. The Image Technical court stated: "We do not believe that Monsanto, without discussing the
court's tying decisions, meant to overturn them." Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
903 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990).
130. See supra note3 34-35, 51-59 and accompanying text.
131. See Systemcare, 85 F.3d at 470.

132. See id ("[We] see no intellectually honest way to distinguish Chanute from the facts of
[Systemcare].").

133. See id. The defendants' two main contentions were that (1) "any case can be distinguished"
and (2) the Chanute majority actually intended to generally disallow contracts as tying agreements as
opposed to disallowing a single-seller conspiracy. See id.
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in Perma Life. " Specifically, Perma Life developed two distinct types of
conspiracies: (1) a coerced tying arrangement between the seller and the plaintiff
and (2) a coerced tying arrangement between the seller and a third-party buyer."5
Some commentators interpret Chanute as a blanket standard requiring a

horizontal conspiracy to establish a section 1 violation."

However, without

support from McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital,37 factually distinguished by Judge

Seymour in her concurring opinion, 3 ' the subject matter of Chanute is strictly
limited to conspiracies between a single plaintiff and a single defendant, 39 the
first type of vertical conspiracy under Perma Life. A narrow reading of the
Chanute opinion would not include restrictions on the PermaLife Court's second

type of vertical conspiracy, involving agreements between a coerced third-party
buyer and a single defendant.
Systemcare, however, alleged that a third-party buyer and a single seller were
co-conspirators. Thus, the plaintiff was invoking the second type of conspiracy
under Perma Life, not the first. The factual distinction the Systemcare I court
should have reconciled involves the difference between the first and second types
of conspiracies, on whether the buyer is the plaintiff or a third-party buyer. The
Systemcare I court presumed Chanute prohibits a filaintiff from establishing a
conspiracy between a coerced third-party buyer and a single seller."
Chanute, however, did not mention disallowing such a conspiracy, nor does the
court specifically mention the second type of conspiracy from Perma Life. By not
recognizing the factual distinction between the first and second types of
conspiracies under Perna Life, the Systemcare I court effectively expanded

134. See generally supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
135. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142 (1968); Albrecht

v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 n.6 (1968) (discussing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S.
44, 45 (1960)); supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
136. See JUDY WHALLEY & CAROLE E. HANDLER, ExcLusivE DEALING, FULL-LINE FORCING AND
TYING ARRANGEMENTS 111 (PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. B4-7134, 1996).

137. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
138. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
139. The Chanute court stated:
Mhe plaintiff must make a preliminary showing of a conspiracy between two persons. . .
The Cities have not shown Williams acted in concert with any other entity. The Cities
name only one defendant. The other parties to the allegedly illegal contracts to establish
the conspiracy are the Cities themselves. We conclude the Cities have failed to make the
requisite preliminary showing of a conspiracy to go forth with their tying claims under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act.
City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 650-51 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted),
overruled by Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
140. See Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 85 F.3d 465, 469 (10th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117
F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997). In Systemcare I, the court provided:

Thus, according to Chanute, a tying arrangement imposed by a single entity is not
proscribed by section one of the Sherman Act, even if that arrangement is embodied in
a contract between seller and buyer. Instead, a plaintiff must establish a conspiracy
between two or more entities to force such an agreement upon a third party.
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Chanute to eliminate conspiracies between a coerced third-party buyer and a single
seller from section 1 consideration. Thus, the court's broad interpretation of
Chanute eliminated virtually all vertical conspiracies in tying arrangements from
consideration under section 1.
V. In Defense of Systemcare I
By requiring a horizontal conspiracy for a section 1 tying arrangement claim, the
Tenth Circuit adopted a minority view.'' However, Service & Training, Inc. v.
Data General Corp.42 does provide some support for the Tenth Circuit position.
Soon after the Ninth Circuit's holding in Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 4 the Fourth Circuit criticized the Ninth Circuit for being overly
broad and missing the point of Monsanto.'" The Fourth Circuit specifically
criticized the opinion on two main points. First, the court disagreed with the Image
Technical court's classification of the illegal tying arrangement.'45 The court
found that a seller could unilaterally ban parts sales to a group of customers who
"service their own equipment" without actually tying the parts to service.'"
Secondly, the Data General court disagreed with the Image Technical
interpretation of the Monsanto evidentiary standard. 7
In Datagate,4' however, the Ninth Circuit responded to the Fourth Circuit's
contentions. The Datagate court maintained that the Data General court merely
analyzed the evidentiary standard involved in proving a conspiracy exists as
opposed to classifying the activity as unilateral or concerted.'49 In other words,
were the plaintiff able to meet the Data General evidentiary standard to prove a
conspiracy existed between the defendant and a third party buyer, then a
conspiracy would exist. The Datagatecourt further implied that Data General is,
nonetheless, consistent with the Ninth Circuit interpretation of Monsanto.'"
In the final analysis, applying the Data General opinion to the defense of
Systemcare I provides little help. The opinion provides little more than support for
a stricter standard in judging evidence proving conspiracies. The opinion does not
disallow vertical conspiracies in tying arrangements altogether, which is what the
Systemcare I opinion does. The most important distinction between the Tenth
Circuit and the Fourth Circuit positions is found in Chanute where the court held
that "forcing of a tying arrangement... [is] moot.'' The Fourth Circuit did not

141. See WHALLEY & HANDLER, supra note 136, at 111.

142. 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
143. 903 F.2d 612, 619 (9th Cir. 1990).
144. See Data Gencral,963 F.2d at 686 n.12.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Datagate, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 60 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1995); see also notes 124-27 and
accompanying text.
149. See Datagate, 60 F.3d at 1427.
150. See id.
151. City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 651 n.11 (10th Cir. 1992),
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hold that coercion is irrelevant in section 1 claims, but rather contended only that
forcing is difficult to prove under the Monsanto standard."
In any event, the Tenth Circuit declined to bring up Data Systems, Monsanto,
or any other support for its decision. The court's arguments stayed strictly within
the context of its own opinions from McKenzie and Chanute. In essence, the court
has disregarded some thirty years worth of antitrust law dating back to Perma Life
and Parke, Davis.
VI. Tenth Circuit PositionAfter Systemcare II
The en banc court met to resolve the conflict between Black Gold I and II and
the Systemcare I panel which was based upon Chanute and McKenzie." Initially,
the Systemcare II court recognizes Black Gold I and 11, previously unmentioned
by the Systemcare I panel, as valid Tenth Circuit precedent." 4 The court notes
the Chanute majority also failed to reference Black Gold I or II despite Judge
Seymour's concurring opinion. 5 '
Fortunately, the en banc proceeding unequivocally settles the conflict. Chanute
and McKenzie are overruled to the extent they disagree with the en banc endorsement of Black Gold I and II." Systemcare I is vacated and its district court
predecessor, no longer burdened by Chanute or McKenzie, is remanded."
[A] contract between a buyer and seller satisfies the concerted action
element of section 1 of the Sherman Act where the seller coerces a
buyer's acquiescence in a tying arrangement imposed by the seller. The
essence of section l's contract, combination, or conspiracy requirement
in the tying context is the agreement, however reluctant, of a buyer to
purchase from a seller a tied product or service along with a tying
product or service. To hold otherwise would be to read the words
"contract" and "combination" out of section 1."
The Systemcare I court found this position poses no threat to traditional views of
unilateral behavior or independent business activity.'" Tying arrangements coerce
the buyer to purchase the tied product through the seller's market power in the

overruled by Systemeare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1997).
152. See Datagate, 963 F.2d at686 n.12.
153. Id. The court did not deal with possible implications of footnote 8 from Kodak, but this issue
becomes academic at the point the Tenth Circuit is in line with Perma Life. Likewise, discussion possible
factual distinctions between Chanute and Systemcare I are unnecessary as these opinions have been
overruled and vacated, respectively.
154. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Laboratories Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1140-41, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997).
"Thus, under Black Gold I and II, a plaintiff satisfies section l's concerted action element by showing
a tying agreement between a seller and a buyer." Id. at 1141.
155. Id. at 1142.
156. Id. at 1145.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1142-43.
159. Id. at 1143.
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tying product."6 Independent decision-making power of a buyer to act within his
own best interests are, therefore, destroyed. 6' Thus, the competitive benefits of
independent behavior are removed, satisfying the conspiracy requirement under
section one." The Systemcare II court agreed that this position does not dilute
the evidentiary standard established in Monsanto.
VII. Impact of Decision
The conflict between Systemcare and Wang is not unique. ISOs are the source
ISOs
of much recent litigation against hardware/software manufacturers."
maintain foreclosure from hardware service markets vis-h-vis manufacturer
hardware/software service policies." The conflict involves an estimated $100
billion service industry.'6
The Systemcare I decision was inconsistent with the two main goals of the
Sherman Act: increasing productive competition and improving consumer
choice. " By excluding coerced vertical conspiracies, the Tenth Circuit was
eliminating a segment of tying arrangement claims allowed by other circuits. Tying
arrangements increase barriers to entry for other service providers, thus decreasing
competition.'
Likewise, under the Systemcare I fact scenario, purchasers of hardware service
were given less choices from which to select their service provider. Coercion
eliminates independent consumer decision making vital to the competitive
process." If both "seller-plaintiff' and "seller-third party" vertical conspiracies
are disallowed, however, then courts within the Tenth Circuit will never reach
decisions evaluating coercion. Systemcare I made coercion an obsolete issue and
potentially opened the door for very anticompetitive interaction between sellers and
buyers. Systemcare II, however, avoids the pitfalls of Systemcare I and brings the
Tenth Circuit in line with antitrust doctrines supported by the Supreme Court.
Notably, the district court on remand could recognize the coerced vertical
conspiracies between a single buyer and single seller, but utilize a stricter
evidentiary standard for proving coercion. In this way, the court could still

Id. at 1144.
Id. at 1143.
Id.
Id. at 1144-45.
164. See J.T. WESTERMEIER, INDEPENDENT SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS: THE BATrLE BETWEEN
ANTrrRUST AND INTELLECTuAL PROPERTY LAws 199 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary
Property Course Handbook Series No. 64-3968, 1996).
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See SULLivAN & HOvENKAMP, supra note 3, at 33.
168. See Fortner Enters., Ing. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969) (citing
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); Times-Picayune Publishing v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 606 (1953).
169. See Jefferson Parish v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
160.
161.
162.
163.
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significantly reduce the number of recognized conspiracies without threatening
healthy competition or contradicting United States Supreme Court antitrust policy.
Interestingly, Systemcare I and II may be of less significance in Oklahoma than
in other states. The Oklahoma antitrust statute is slightly different than the
Sherman Act. The statute prohibits any "act... in restraint of trade.""l7' In 1996,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the statute to forbid individual acts
as well as combinations."' Thus, for actions brought under Oklahoma state law,
a combination need not be proven. For federal claims, however, the Sherman Act
will still apply and individual behavior is still protected.
VIII. Conclusion
Seldom does the opportunity present itself to correct an err in judgement. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals took advantage of this opportunity in June of 1997
in Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang LaboratoriesCorp. The en banc court resolved an
important inconsistency in antitrust decisions. Thus, the Tenth Circuit is now
consistent with prior circuit precedent and is "in harmony with both the law of the
Supreme Court and our sister circuits."'" By overruling the standard for establishing independent behavior set by Chanute and McKenzie, the Tenth Circuit
reinforces Supreme Court antitrust decisions dating back to Parke, Davis.
Michael R. Barnett

170. 79 OKLA. STAT. § 1 (1994).
171. See Harolds Stores, Inc. v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 82 F.3d 1533, 1549-51 (10th Cir. 1996).
However, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has not addressed whether the statute prohibits unilateral acts.
See id. at 1549.
172. Systemcare, Inc. v. Wang Labs. Corp., 117 F.3d 1137, 1145 (10th Cir. 1997).
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